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John L Hill* and David C. Kent**
HE state and federal courts in Texas resolved several significant
issues relating to administrative law in the past year. As in previ-
ous Surveys, this Article discusses the decisions in three broad ar-
eas: constitutional considerations, administrative adjudications, and
judicial review.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Notice and Hearing
A fundamental tenet of procedural due process is that a person must
have notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the government may
deprive him of life, liberty, or property. I The nature of the requisite notice
and hearing varies, however, with the facts of each case. 2 During the sur-
vey period Texas courts generally held that parties raising due process ar-
guments received all the notice and hearing to which they were entitled.
In Tarrant County v. Ashmore3 the Supreme Court of Texas discussed
the rights of public officeholders in retaining their offices and distinguished
the notice and hearing requirements that apply to determinations of legis-
lative facts from those that apply to determinations of adjudicative facts.4
In 1980 the Tarrant County commissioners court redrafted the boundary
lines for justice of the peace and constable precincts and abolished the
existing justice and constable offices. Three incumbent justices and one
constable sued the commissioners for declaratory and injunctive relief and
for damages. They asserted a property interest in their offices and claimed
that the commissioners could not remove them from office prior to the
expiration of their elected terms without first affording them a full adver-
sary hearing. The trial court entered a judgment for the plaintiffs and the
court of appeals affirmed, holding that the commissioners court proceed-
ings deprived the plaintiffs of a property interest without due process, and
B.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Hughes & Hill, Austin, Texas.
B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Hughes & Hill, Dallas, Texas.
1. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). The no-
tice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."
Id at 314.
2. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 US. 886, 894-95 (1961).
3. 635 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. 1982).
4. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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that the plaintiffs could therefore recover from the county the salaries and
benefits they would have received had they remained in office.5
The supreme court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled
to a trial-type proceeding and the attendant procedural safeguards. 6 The
decision rested on the court's distinction between "legislative" and "adju-
dicative" facts. Legislative facts, which concern matters of policy and ad-
ministrative discretion, affect individual parties only indirectly through
such parties' involvement in the general legislative scheme.7 Adjudicative
facts, however, affect individual parties directly; such facts answer ques-
tions of "who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or in-
tent."8 Determinations of adjudicative facts therefore call for the full
procedural safeguards of a trial-type proceeding, while legislative fact-
finding may take place in a nonadversarial setting.9
In Ashmore the supreme court held that the redistricting order was a
legislative or quasi-legislative act involving resolution of essentially polit-
ical issues.' 0 Because the commissioners court hearings did not involve a
determination of adjudicative facts, a trial-type proceeding was not neces-
sary to protect the plaintiffs.'I Moreover, because the commissioners court
issued its order abolishing the plaintiffs' offices only after extensive public
hearing and debate, and because each of the plaintiffs actually attended at
least one hearing, the supreme court held that the plaintiffs received as
much protection as they were due.' 2
Under certain circumstances a person is not entitled to notice of an ad-
ministrative proceeding and opportunity to appear even though the pro-
ceeding involves a determination of adjudicative facts. This issue arose in
In re M G. ,3 a paternity suit instituted by the Texas Department of
Human Resources (TDHR). The trial court declared Juan Castro the fa-
ther of the child in question and ordered him to pay child support. Cas-
tro's complaint concerned not the paternity suit itself, in which Castro
fully participated, but rather a prior administrative hearing determining
the mother's eligibility to receive financial assistance in the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Castro received no notice of
the AFDC proceeding and did not participate in it. As a direct result of
the determination at the AFDC hearing, the TDHR instituted the pater-
nity suit seeking child support payments from Castro. Castro therefore
5. 624 S.W.2d 740, 745-46 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981).
6. 635 S.W.2d at 423.
7. Id.
8. Id. (citing K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12:3 (2d ed. 1978)).
9. 635 S.W.2d at 423.
10. Id The court based this holding on the fact that TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
2351% (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1982-1983), was a grant of authority from the people and the
legislature to the commissioners to redraft precinct lines and abolish existing offices. 635
S.W.2d at 423.
11. 635 S.W.2d at 423.
12. Id at 424. During the survey period the supreme court also upheld a taxing statute
against due process claims alleging inadequate notice and hearing. Shaw v. Phillips Crane
& Rigging, 636 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex. 1982).
13. 625 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
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asserted that the failure to provide him notice and opportunity to contest
the mother's eligibility for benefits violated due process.
Although it acknowledged the connection between the two proceedings,
the court of appeals nevertheless held that Castro was not entitled to notice
of the AFDC hearing.' 4 An adversarial proceeding "presupposes a com-
pulsory attendance of parties at a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding and
forfeiture of some right for failure to attend."' 5 The AFDC hearing lacked
these qualities because it determined only the mother's right to receive
AFDC benefits without affecting Castro's property rights. Only the pater-
nity suit affected Castro's rights, and Castro received notice and all other
procedural safeguards required by law for that proceeding. Accordingly,
the court rejected the due process challenge.' 6
Notice must not simply inform a person of a scheduled proceeding, but
must also give him an opportunity to prepare for the proceeding. If a
person thinks the notice he receives is inadequate, he must voice his com-
plaint in a timely manner in order to preserve error. In Sabine Bank v.
State Banking Board17 the appellant claimed that it did not receive ade-
quate notice of a hearing before the State Banking Board because the no-
tice did not state the law regarding the issues that the Board would
decide.' 8 The evidence indicated that during the three months between
the notice and the hearing the appellant failed to request either a bill of
particulars or a postponement of the hearing to enhance its ability to pre-
pare for the proceeding, and that the appellant nevertheless fully litigated
the issues it said should have been stated in the notice. The court held that
these facts clearly demonstrated that the notice neither surprised nor mis-
led the appellant as to issues of fact and law, and, therefore, that the notice
was adequate.' 9
B. Vagueness
In Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Texas Department of Health 20 the appellant
attacked the Texas Department of Health's municipal solid waste manage-
ment regulations on the grounds that they were unconstitutionally vague.,
The Department had denied Browning-Ferris's application for a solid'
waste disposal permit because the proposed landfill would constitute an
"improper land use," a ground contained in the Department's regulations
for refusing an application. Browning-Ferris argued that because the reg-
ulations did not define the terms "land use" and "improper land use," they
14. Id. at 749.
15. Id
16. Id. at 750.
17. 630 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin), writ dismr'dper curiam, 639 S.W.2d 303
(Tex. 1982).
18. 630 S.W.2d at 525. The hearing concerned a bank's application to change its domi-
cile within a city. The appellant contended that the rule of Citizens Bank v. First State
Bank, 580 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1979), regarding the standards for granting such an application,
must be set out in the notice. .630 S.W.2d at 525.
19. 630 S.W.2d at 526.
20. 625 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1983]
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failed to furnish adequate guidelines or standards for the denial or grant-
ing of a permit and so were void for vagueness.
The court of appeals stated that a regulation violates due process "if it
requires the doing of an act so vague that persons of common intelligence
must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."' 2' The court
admitted that the term "land use" was broad, but held that it was no more
general than other standards which had withstood vagueness chaUenges.
22
The court noted that the regulations listed several considerations to guide
the Department's determinations. These factors imposed parameters on
the meaning of the term "improper land use," thus precluding a finding of
vagueness as to that term.23 Comparing the regulations to other environ-
mental laws that draw their effectiveness from broad and flexible stan-
dards, the court stated that if the regulations were too precise, they would
provide "easy escape for those who wish to circumvent the law."' 24 The
court thus upheld the regulations and the Department's denial of Brown-
ing-Ferris's application. 25
C Equal Protection
One of the inherent powers and fundamental purposes of government is
to regulate business and control the use of property within its borders
when necessary for the health, safety and general welfare of its citizenry.26
This police power includes the authority to classify and regulate business
entities according to the organization and purpose of their business. 27 Un-
less a classification distinguishes on a suspect basis (such as race, religion,
or alienage) or affects a fundamental personal right, it generally will be
upheld. States thus have wide latitude to regulate their local economies,
and an economic classification normally withstands constitutional scrutiny
if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.28 The survey period
presented two interesting cases applying these principles.
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner of Insurance29 in-
21. Id. at 765.
22. Id. at 767 (citing Jordan v. State Bd. of Ins., 160 Tex. 506, 334 S.W.2d 278 (1960)
("not worthy of the public confidence"); Texas Pet Foods, Inc. v. State, 529 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (definition of air pollution in Texas Clean Air Act,
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983)); Morgan v. Texas
Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 519 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ)
("based on general welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the people, and on the pub-
lic sense of decency"); Martinez v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 476 S.W.2d 400
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) ("grossly unprofessional conduct, or a
character which in the opinion of the Board is likely to deceive or defraud the public")).
23. 625 S.W.2d at 766-67.
24. Id at 767-68.
25. Id.
26. Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 9-10, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478 (1934).
27. Hurt v. Cooper, 130 Tex. 433, 440-41, 110 S.W.2d 896, 900-01 (1937); Texas Co. v.
Stephens, 100 Tex. 628, 640-41, 103 S.W. 481, 484-85 (1907).
28. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). If the classification affects
a fundamental personal right or relies on inherently suspect distinctions, it is subject to
much stricter scrutiny. Id
29. 626 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1981, writ retd n.r.e.).
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volved an attack upon the taxation of health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) under the Texas Insurance Code. Section 20A.33(a) of the Insur-
ance Code30 imposed a tax upon corporate HMOs but not upon
noncorporate HMOs, thereby effectively placing on the corporate HMOs
all costs of administering the Texas Health Maintenance Organization
Act.3' Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. claimed that article 20A.33(a)
denied it equal protection of the laws. The court of appeals agreed and
ordered a refund to Prudential of over $70,000 in taxes Prudential had
paid under protest. 32
The court first determined that the charge article 20A.33(a) imposed was
a regulatory fee rather than a revenue tax.33 This finding rested on the
article's express purpose "[t]o defray the expense of carrying out the provi-
sions of this Act."' 34 Because the exaction was not a tax, it was not subject
to the requirement of the Texas Constitution that taxes be "equal and uni-
form."'35 The court held, however, that the distinction between corporate
and noncorporate HMOs was not a reasonable basis for unequal taxation
because the business of every HMO is the same regardless of its form of
organization. 36 The court noted that all other sections of the Health Main-
tenance Organization Act treated corporate and noncorporate HMOs sub-
stantially the same. 37 Finally, the court held that the fact that the
Insurance Commissioner had assessed an identical charge against the only
noncorporate HMO in Texas did not cure the defect in article 20A.33(a);
the court stated that the commissioner could not remedy by administrative
action the constitutional infirmities of the statute.38
Maceluch v. Wyson 39 involved a less successful equal protection chal-
lenge to the refusal of the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners to
permit two osteopathic physicians to identify themselves with the initials
"M.D." rather than the initials "D.O." because their diplomas read "Doc-
tor of Osteopathy." The board relied on a statute providing that physi-
cians whom the Board licenses on the basis of Doctor of Osteopathy
degrees must use the initials "D.O.," while only persons licensed on the
basis of Doctor of Medicine degrees may use the term "M.D." 4  The
30. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 214, § 33, at 530-3 1. The legislature amended article
20A.33 after the occurrences giving rise to this action. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.33(Vernon 1981). The court noted that the amendment cured the constitutional defects in the
statute. 626 S.W.2d at 825 n.5.
31. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.01-.35 (Vernon 1981).
32. 626 S.W.2d at 832-33.
33. Id. at 829.
34. Id.
35. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
36. 626 S.W.2d at 830.
37. Id at 830-31.
38. Id. at 832. The court upheld the constitutionality of art. 20A.33(b) of the Insurance
Code, which imposes a gross premiums tax on corporate HMOs only. The rationale for the
holding was that the tax is a substitute for the state franchise tax, which does not apply to
HMOs and other insurance companies. 626 S.W.2d at 832.
39. 680 F.2d 1062 (5th Cir. 1982).




plaintiffs contended that the D.O. designation tarnished their public image
and was less favorable in the eyes of the public than an M.D. designation
and argued that this distinction in terminology constituted a denial of
equal protection.
The osteopaths first argued that they received virtually the same training
as medical doctors and should therefore enjoy identical treatment. The
court noted, however, that the plaintiffs' training differed significantly
from that of medical doctors, and therefore the legislature could rationally
distinguish the two groups on the basis of those differences. 4' The osteo-
paths next argued that the statute treated them unfairly because it allowed
graduates of foreign medical schools to use the initials "M.D." even
though their degrees did not read "Doctor of Medicine" or "Doctor." The
court also rejected this argument, holding that the training of an osteopath
differed from that of graduates of foreign medical schools just as it differed
from the training of graduates of American medical schools.42 Finally, the
plaintiffs argued that because the public understands the term "M.D." to
indicate a qualified licensed physician, preventing osteopaths from using
that term would confuse the public as to the true nature of an osteopath's
profession and training. The court stated, however, that this very percep-
tion of the term "M.D.," whether right or wrong, was a rational basis for
the legislature's distinction between osteopaths and medical doctors, be-
cause it prevented deception of those persons who knew the difference be-
tween the two groups.43
D. L!fe, Liberty, and Property Interests
Due process protections come into play only when a case involves a life,
liberty, or property interest. Pope v. City of Dallas" forcefully demon-
strates this principle. Pope alleged that a decision by the Chief of Police
demoting Pope from the position of Assistant Chief to Captain violated his
property rights in his job. The court held, however, that Pope had no
property right in his position, and that being a police officer is a privilege
involving no constitutional right.45 Pope also claimed that the demotion
impaired his liberty because it damaged his reputation, honor, and com-
41. 680 F.2d at 1066-67.
42. Id at 1068.
43. Id. at 1069. In upholding the statute the court concluded:
This court does not sit de novo as a legislative body, nor will it do so under the
cloak of equal protection. A federal court decree is clean, swift, and difficult
to overturn. Its powers attract those who have lost in the rough and tumble of
legislative politics, but its power is undemocratic and antimajoritarian. Ac-
cordingly, the rationale for the exercise of judicial power requires, at the least,
that the "constitutional" interest impinged by the legislature be one traceable
to the Constitution. The Court has no veto. That belongs to the governor.
And saying it is the Constitution that vetoes does not make it so.
Id at 1070. For another equal protection case from the survey period, see Colony Mun.
Util. Dist. v. Appraisal Dist., 626 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (right of equal protection extends to persons only, not to political subdivisions).
44. 636 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
45. Id at 246.
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munity standing. Pope did not allege, however, that the department made
public any of the reasons for his demotion. Thus, no deprivation of liberty
occurred because "[liberty is not infringed by derogatory information in
confidential personnel files." 46 Accordingly, the court rejected Pope's due
process claims.47
The Texas Supreme Court made a similar point in Tarrant County v.
Ashmore,48 in which constables and justices of the peace sued for their
salaries for the remainder of their elected terms after the county commis-
sioners' redistricting order prematurely removed them from office. One of
the plaintiffs' theories was that their removal from office was an unconsti-
tutional taking of their property without compensation. 49 The supreme
court held, however, that the plaintiffs had no property interest in their
employment, because public office is a position of trust or responsibility
rather than a right.50 While public officers have a financial interest in their
positions that merits protection against interference by private parties, this
qualified interest is not property in the constitutional sense.51 Justice Pope,
writing for the court, stated: "[E]very public officeholder remains in his
position at the sufferance and for the benefit of the public, subject to re-
moval from office by edict of the ballot box at the time of the next election,
or before that time by any other constitutionally permissible means. '52
The commissioners court issued its redistricting order pursuant to a valid
statute;53 the fact that the order prevented some county officials from serv-
ing out their elected terms did not infringe upon a constitutionally pro-
tected property right.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS
A4. Exhaustion of Remedies
The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies concerns the timing of judicial
review of agency actions and the efficient and orderly administration of
justice. Courts generally prohibit a party from seeking judicial relief until
he has pursued all internal administrative avenues. For example, in
46. Id. For Pope to allege due process arguments was important, because he had re-
signed from the police force prior to completion of the administrative. review of his demo-
tion. By resigning, he forfeited his right to any further administrative action and eliminated
the chance of developing a record to take before the district court for review under the
substantial evidence rule. Accordingly, he retained no effective right to judicial review of
the administrative action. Id at 247.
47. Id at 246.
48. 635 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. 1982); see supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text.
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without compensation."); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("No person's property shall be taken...
without adequate compensation .
50. 635 S.W.2d at 420.
51. Id at 422.
52. Id at 421; see Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577 (1900) ("[Plublic offices are
mere agencies or trusts, and not property as such .... [T]he relation of a public officer to
the public is inconsistent with either a property or a contract right.").
53. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2351 2 (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1982-1983).
19831
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Springfield v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Insurance Co. 54 the plaintiffs
brought a class action against several automobile insurers challenging the
validity of a policy endorsement prescribed by the State Board of Insur-
ance. The Insurance Code provided policyholders a mechanism for
presenting to the Board grievances relating to endorsements the Board ap-
proved or disapproved. 5" The plaintiffs had failed, however, to avail
themselves of this remedy. The supreme court, stating that exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a prerequisite to judicial review, held that the
plaintiffs could not challenge the endorsement in the courts without first
having sought the administrative review.56
In Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association v. Miller57 a policy-
holder sued the Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association for de-
nial of liability without first appealing the denial to the State Board of
Insurance as the Insurance Code prescribes.5 8 The plaintiffs insurance
policies did not refer to the adminisrative hearing requirement. The
policyholder claimed that this omission exempted him from the provisions
of the statute, and that compliance with all policy provisions entitled him
to sue the association immediately. The court of appeals ruled against the
insured, holding that the statutory provisions were mandatory and juris-
dictional and could not be waived in the insurance policy.59 The court
therefore directed the trial court to dismiss the case for want of
jurisdiction. 60
An exception to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine arises when the
agency is powerless to provide the relief sought and when the agency acts
beyond the scope of its authority.61 Roskey v. Texas Health Facilities Com-
mission,62 a suit to declare void an exemption certificate the Texas Health
Facilities Commission had issued, illustrates this exception. The trial
court dismissed the suit in part because it found that the plaintiffs had not
exhausted their administrative remedies before the commission. The court
of appeals held, however, that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply be-
54. 620 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1981).
55. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.11 (Vernon 1981). The statute confers a right of appeal
to the courts of an adverse decision by the board at any such hearing. Id.
56. 620 S.W.2d at 559.
57. 625 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
58. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49, § 9 (Vernon 1981) (Catastrophe Property Insurance
Pool Act). The legislature created the association in 1971. The association consists of all
property insurers authorized to do business in Texas. Id § 3(k). Section 9 provides for a
hearing before the State Board of Insurance to resolve disputes between policyholders and
the association, and it explicitly creates a right of appeal to the courts from the board's
decision. Id § 9.
59. 625 S.W.2d at 347. "The right to appeal from an administrative order to the courts
is not a natural right but one that may be granted or withheld at the discretion of the legisla-
ture . . . . When the legislature prescribes a method for judicial review of administrative
action, the method must be followed to confer jurisdiction on the court." Id
60. Id
61. Foree v. Crown Petroleum Corp., 431 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. 1968); Glen Oaks Utils.
Inc. v. City of Houston, 161 Tex. 417, 420, 340 S.W.2d 783, 785 (1960). These exceptions
apply equally to the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Foree, 431 S.W.2d at 316.




cause the Texas Health Planning and Development Act,63 which author-
ized issuance of the certificate, contained no provisions for reopening the
administrative hearing or voiding an exemption certificate upon the appli-
cation of a person in the plaintiffs' position.64 Pursuit of an internal ad-
ministrative appeal would thus have been a futile act and was therefore
unnecessary. Moreover, the plaintiffs based their cause of action on the
theory that the commission lacked statutory authority to issue the certifi-
cate. In such a case, the court held, the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies is inapplicable. 65
B. Primary Jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is closely related to the exhaustion
of remedies rule, in that both concern the timing of judicial action. The
difference between the two doctrines is that primary jurisdiction inquires
whether the court or the agency should have initial jurisdiction of a pro-
ceeding, while exhaustion inquires whether or not agency action is ripe for
judicial review. The primary jurisdiction doctrine finds support in the no-
tion that allowing an administrative agency the first opportunity to deal
with a problem leads to consistency and uniformity in policy administra-
tion and takes advantage of the agency's expertise in handling technical
and complex issues.
The Supreme Court of Texas applied this rationale in State v. Associated
Metals & Minerals Corp. 66 to prevent a district court from interfering with
administration of state air pollution control laws. The suit originated in
1975 when the state brought an enforcement action against Associated
Metals & Minerals Corporation for violation of the Texas Clean Air Act 67
in the operation of its tin smelting plant. In 1977 Associated Metals ap-
plied to the Texas Air Control Board for a permit to build new smelting
facilities. These proceedings culminated in the granting of the permit and
in an agreed judgment in 1978 in the enforcement action ordering Associ-
ated Metals to comply with the Clean Air Act in operating the new facility.
In 1979 and 1980 Associated Metals informally requested the board to
agree to a modification of the 1978 judgment allowing use of different pol-
lution control devices. When the board refused to consent to the change,
Associated Metals petitioned the trial court to modify the judgment. The
court granted this request, prescribing the specific emission standards and
pollution control methods that Associated Metals was to follow. The
supreme court reversed the trial court judgment, holding that Associated
Metals's proper course of action was a formal application to the board for
modification of the company's operating permit.68 The court held that the
trial court's role was not to grant or deny permits or to set emission levels,
63. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4418h (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
64. 630 S.W.2d at 845.
65. Id
66. 635 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. 1982).
67. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983).
68. 635 S.W.2d at 411.
1983]
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but only to review the board's actions.69 In this case the trial court did not
merely supervise the enforcement of its own judgment. Instead, it actively
implemented the Clean Air Act, which the court held was a responsibility
the legislature gave exclusively to the board.70 Thus the board, and not the
trial court, had primary jurisdiction to determine whether the company
could alter its pollution control devices.
Another case invoking the primary jurisdiction rule was Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Toman,71 in which a real estate developer sued the directors
of a municipal utility district, alleging that they had engaged in illegal and
ultra vires acts for the purpose of destroying the plaintiffs business. Most
of the plaintiffs allegations related directly to the defendants' responsibili-
ties as directors in making decisions affecting the district's operation. As
such, the defendants' actions were subject to the supervision and control of
the Texas Water Board.72 In determining who had primary jurisdiction,
the court noted that the question was "not whether some parts of the case
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts but whether some parts
of the case are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the agency. ' 73 Because
most of the issues in this case concerned matters within the jurisdiction of
the Texas Water Board, the court held that the board should first deter-
mine such matters.74
In contrast, the court of appeals in Singer v. Clayton Brokerage Co. 75
refused to apply the primary jurisdiction rule. In Singer the plaintiff sued
his commodities broker and brokerage house, alleging fraud and deceptive
trade practices in connection with purchases of silver futures the plaintiff
made on his broker's advice. The defendants argued that the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) possessed either exclusive or pri-
mary jurisdiction with respect to transactions in commodity futures con-
tracts. The defendants relied on section 2 of the Commodity Exchange
Act, which provides that "the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to accounts, agreements . . . and transactions involving con-
tracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery. '76
The court rejected the defendant's contention, noting that the Act also
provided that "[n]othing in this section shall supersede or limit the juris-
69. Id at 410.
70. Id.
71. 624 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 12.081, 54.024 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
73. 624 S.W.2d at 681 (quoting K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 19.07 (1950)).
74. 624 S.W.2d at 681. The fact that the Board could not award the plaintiff the dam-
ages it sought did not sway the court because the Board had authority to make findings of
fact essential to the subsequent judicial award of damages. Id at 681. Neither did the
plaintiff's allegation that the defendants acted illegally persuade the court because such an
allegation involved the complex and technical aspects of managing the utility district, mat-
ters the Board was more competent than the court to decide. Id at 681-82. The court held,
however, that the trial court could retain jurisdiction of the portion of the lawsuit involving
allegations of slander and tortious interference with contract because these causes of action
were severable from the claims in which the Board had primary jurisdiction. Id. at 682.
75. 620 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1981).
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diction conferred on courts of the United States or any State."'77 The court
concluded that the statute created exclusive federal jurisdiction to regulate
futures trading, but did not preempt the courts' jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims that were inherently judicial in nature although they related to fu-
tures trading.78 Moreover, the CFTC itself had adopted the position that
resolution of actions for damages for violations of the Act rarely required
the Commission's expertise and thus lent themselves to judicial rather than
administrative determination. The court therefore held that the plaintiffs
suit was maintainable in the Texas courts.79
C Investigatory Powers
One of the great burdens associated with complex commercial litigation
is the pretrial discovery process of producing documents for inspection and
copying. A discovery request for the production of every conceivable doc-
ument in the opposing party's possession, however remotely related to the
subject matter of the suit, is a standard practice. The same burden is often
associated with administrative proceedings in which the private litigant
can be confronted with a burdensome administrative subpoena.
An administrative agency's subpoena power is broad and is generally
subject to only two limitations: (1) the subpoena must be for a lawfully
authorized purpose; and (2) it must seek information relevant to the
agency's inquiry.80 Courts, however, are not lax in enforcing these two
limitations. For example, in Sunshine Gas Co. v. United States Department
of Energy8 the court vigorously examined the subpoena the Department
of Energy had issued. The Department had subpoenaed virtually all of the
company's records for a six-year period in connection with its investigation
of petroleum price overcharges. The court focused on the requirement
that the information sought be relevant to the agency's inquiry and held
that in order for the court to determine relevance, the agency had to state
the purpose behind its subpoena.82 As the court explained:
The function of this court is to determine if the agency has given rea-
soned consideration to all material facts and issues. This calls for
insistence that the agency articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons
for decision, and identify the significance of critical facts, a course
which assures the agency's policies effectuate general standards, ap-
77. Id.
78. 620 S.W.2d at 724.
79. Id
80. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 313 (1978); United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209
(1946). Additionally, the agency must not already possess the information and must follow
the required administrative steps for issuance of the subpoena. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S.
at 313-14; Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58. Some courts have removed these last two restrictions.
See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 564 F.2d 953, 959 (Temp. Em. Ct. App. 1977) (additional
requirements too restrictive); United States v. Security State Bank & Trust, 473 F.2d 638,
641(5th Cir. 1973) (subpoena must meet the two primary requirements).
81. 524 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
82. Id at 838. "The agency's order should only be affirmed if a rational basis exists, but
such must be supplied by the agency, not the court." Id
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plied without unreasonable discrimination.8 3
The Department of Energy was able to cite only possible or potential in-
volvement on the part of Sunshine Gas Company in the price overcharg-
ing scheme. The court held this was an insufficient justification for such a
sweeping subpoena.84 While recognizing that it was placing a much heav-
ier burden on the government than most courts would, the court concluded
that equity demanded that the government bear such a burden.8 5
An additional ground for refusing to enforce an administrative sub-
poena is agency failure to follow the required procedural steps in issuing it.
This was the situation presented in Hunt P. United States Securities & Ex-
change Commission .86 This case derived in part from the Securities & Ex-
change Commission's (SEC) investigation of the Hunt brothers'
involvement in the "silver crises" in the commodities futures market. The
Hunts had sought to obtain injunctive relief preventing the SEC from
obtaining financial information from some of their banks in violation of
the Right to Financial Privacy Act.8 7 The district court granted the re-
quested relief based on its finding of numerous instances in which the SEC
acted with reckless disregard for the plaintiffs' rights under that Act.8 8 In
defending itself, the SEC argued that injunctive relief was inappropriate
because it had never received any information in response to its illegal
subpoenas and, therefore, had not actually harmed the Hunts. The court
rejected this argument and held that the entire purpose of the Act would
be "gutted" if a plaintiff could not enjoin the improper disclosure of pro-
tected information.8 9 Hopefully, bizarre fact situations such as this one do
not characterize the government's use of administrative subpoenas.
D. Standing
The law of standing continues to be something of a conundrum in
Texas. Traditionally, one possessed standing to sue only if he had a "spe-
cial injury," some damage in fact, peculiar to himself and not commonly
shared by the public at large. 90 With the City of Houston v. Public Utility
83. Id. at 839.
84. The court held that the mandatory "articulation of purpose" was not satisfied by a
mere suspicion on the part of the agency. Id
85. Id. at 841.
86. 520 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
87. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (Supp. V 1981).
88. 520 F. Supp. at 608. The Act requires that an agency send a copy of its administra-
tive subpoena to the person whose financial records are being requested. 12 U.S.C.
§ 3045(2) (Supp. V 1981). In this case the SEC deliberately sent incomplete and excised
copies of the subpoenas to the Hunts and deliberately failed to inform the Hunts of other
subpoenas, conduct the court found to be "simply beyond rational explanation." 520 F.
Supp. at 608.
89. 520 F. Supp. at 607. "To make unlawful disclosure of the customer's financial
records a rerequisite to injunctive relief would turn traditional principles of equity on their
head." IS
90. See Harding v. Commissioners' Court, 95 Tex. 174, 175, 66 S.W. 44, 45 (1902); cf.
Devorsky v. La Vega Indep. School Dist., 635 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982,
no writ) (residency in district gives plaintiff standing to sue school district).
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Commission91 and Hooks v. Texas Department of Water Resources92 deci-
sions, however, the supreme court examined the special injury require-
ment. It appeared that the special injury requirement had perhaps been
eliminated,9 3 yet many questions remained.
The Austin court of appeals sought to answer some of these questions in
Texas Industrial Traffic League v. Railroad Commission,94 an appeal of a
Commission order increasing motor carriers' service rates. The question
presented was whether or not a trade association representing the users of
motor carriers' services had standing to appeal the Commission's order on
behalf of its members. The Commission's order did not harm the trade
association since the association itself did not utilize the services of motor
carriers; only its members utilized such services and only they were the
parties injured by the higher rates. Although no one raised the issue of
standing in the trial court, the court of appeals viewed it as a matter of
fundamental error and addressed the subject at length.95 After an exhaus-
tive analysis of the development in Texas of the law of standing, the court
of appeals concluded that the case needed to be remanded to the trial court
to receive evidence on the issue of whether the rate increase would in fact
harm the association's members.96 If so, the association could serve as a
representative party for all of its members. 97 The Supreme Court of
Texas, in a rather pointed opinion, reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals, holding that the issue of standing did not rise to the level of fun-
damental error and was therefore waived as a point of appeal when not
presented to the trial court.98
Although the appellate court judgment was reversed, the opinion is nev-
ertheless notable for its discussion of standing, particularly since the
supreme court did not reach that issue. Most importantly, the court of
appeals concluded that the special injury requirement for standing is no
longer the law in Texas; the test is "whether the one seeking judicial review
is adversely affected, in fact, by the agency decision." 99 The court empha-
sized that only some adverse impact, even if relatively slight, is required
for a person to have standing.1 00 The complaining party still must have a
91. 610 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1980).
92. 611 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. 1981), rev'g 602 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980).
93. See Hill & Kent, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law 36 Sw. L.J. 527,
536-38 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hill & Kent, 1982 Survey]; Hill & Kent, Administrative
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 465, 473-76 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hill &
Kent, 1981 Survey]; Spears & Sanford, Standing to AppealAdministrative Decisions in Texas,
33 BAYLOR L. REV. 215, 224 (1981).
94. 628 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin), rev'dper curiam, 633 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.
1982).
95. 628 S.W.2d at 189.
96. Id. at 205-06.
97. Id at 205.
98. 633 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1982). The court held that the court of appeals "erred in
writing on this issue [of standing] at all" and noted that the court had failed to write on any
of the points of error actually raised by the parties. Id The case was remanded to the court
of appeals for a decision on the merits. Id
99. 628 S.W.2d at 200-01.
100. Id at 201.
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personal stake in the outcome of the suit and cannot complain of purely
abstract or theoretical harm. 10 1 While noting a trend in Texas towards a
liberal view of standing, the court rejected the notion that any private citi-
zen would have standing on behalf of the public at large to challenge any
official agency action. It stated that Texas law has "limited the opportu-
nity for standing to some discreet [sic] segment of the public or an individ-
ual having a special interest in the subject matter of the suit, coupled with
some slight [personal] impact, in circumstances that presented a public is-
sue of some importance."' 10 2 The law of standing will continue to develop
in Texas and the court of appeals opinion in Texas Industrial Traffic
League will probably play an important role in that development.
Meanwhile, the case of County Commissioners Court v. Williams 10 3 gives
some indication of the broad limits of the rule. A Dallas County attorney
filed suit contesting a county commissioners court order allocating and as-
signing courtroom space in the county buildings, which he claimed was
arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory. The commissioners court argued
that the plaintiff attorney lacked standing because he could demonstrate
no special injury personal to himself and distinct from that suffered by the
public at large. The court of appeals disagreed and held that the plaintiff
attorney, by virtue of his special interest in his own profession, had stand-
ing to challenge action that was damaging to the profession. 104 This hold-
ing is questionable because the adverse impact upon the attorney appears
to be remote, especially when measured by his allegations that the com-
missioners court's order would prejudice the "plaintiffs rights, the rights of
his clients, the citizens of Dallas County and our system of justice." 105 This
declaration sounds like a complaint of the public at large. Nevertheless,
the allegations were sufficient to confer standing upon the individual attor-
ney to bring suit.1' 6 Perhaps they meet the tests suggested by the Texas
Industrial Traffic League opinion as an outer limit of the concept of
standing. 107
101. Id "[Slomething more than a legal error by the agency is required for access to the
courts, that is, some effect in fact upon the plaintiff is required; one is not entitled to judicial
review merely because he was allowed to participate as a party in the agency proceedings."
Id
102. Id. at 203 n.8.
103. 638 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, no writ).
104. Id at 221.
105. Id.
106. The court also held that other attorneys had standing as resident taxpayers to attack
the legality of a commissioners court order concerning the operation of the county law li-
brary. 638S.W.2d at 222; cf. Devorsky v. La Vega Indep. School Dist., 635 S.W.2d 904, 909
(Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, no writ) (resident taxpayers have standing to sue to enjoin
alleged illegal expenditures of school district bond issue proceeds).
107. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. The Eastland court of appeals also
relied upon the authority of Touchy v. Houston Legal Found., 432 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968),
that private attorneys had standing to institute suit on behalf of "the interest of the legal
profession, as well as the interest of the public" to enjoin "conduct of non-lawyers which is
demeaning to the legal profession and harmful to the plaintiffs." Id at 695. In Texas Indus.
Traffic League the Austin court of appeals seems to be critical of the Touchy opinion. See




The enabling statutes that create administrative agencies always em-
power the agencies to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to
implement and administer the purposes of the statute. Controversies fre-
quently arise as to whether or not an agency has been granted the legisla-
tive authority to promulgate the particular rule in issue. An agency can
adopt only such rules as are authorized by and consistent with its statutory
authority. 0 8 A reviewing court must be able to harmonize the rule with
the general objective of the statute.10 9
These considerations were brought to bear in Jackson v. Waco Independ-
ent School District.I 10 In order to implement effectively a federal court-
ordered school desegregation plan, the Waco Independent School District
(Waco ISD) adopted a residence requirement granting tuition-free educa-
tion only to children in the district residing with their parent, guardian, or
managing conservator. The plaintiffs failed to qualify for free education
under this rule because they lived with their grandmother, who was not
their legal guardian or managing conservator. The plaintiffs attacked the
Waco ISD rule as violating the Texas Education Code's residency require-
ments, in which the only essential restriction is that the student not be
residing in the district for the primary purpose of attending school. " ' I The
court upheld the Waco ISD rule against these attacks, holding that the
school board had broad authority under the Education Code to manage
and govern the schools and to adopt "such rules, regulations and by-laws
as they may deem proper."' 12 The court justified the residency rule as a
means of complying with the federal court desegregation order and con-
cluded that a school board has the power to make specific rules governing
the operation of the schools even if these rules are in addition to specific
statutory rules.' 13
In promulgating a rule, an administrative agency must not act arbitrar-
ily or capriciously and must have a legitimate reason for the rule.' '4 Be-
yond this, however, an agency is given broad powers in determining what
rules to adopt.' 15 Bullock v. Hewlett-Packard Co. 116 involved a rule of the
Comptroller of Public Accounts for computing franchise taxes. The rule
gave corporations an optional method for computing their taxes, but re-
quired them to notify the Comptroller by June 1 of their intent to use this
method. Hewlett-Packard failed to make this election by June 1 and con-
108. Kelly v. Industrial Accident Bd., 358 S.W.2d 874, 876-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1962, writ ref'd).
109. Gerst v. Oak Cliff Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 432 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. 1968).
110. 629 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
111. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The Code allows
residency to be based on either where the student lives or where his parent, guardian, or
person having lawful control of him lives. Id § 21.03 l(b)-(c).
112. 629 S.W.2d at 205; TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 23.26 (Vernon 1972).
113. 629 S.W.2d at 205.
114. Gerst v. Oak Cliff Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 432 S.W.2d at 707.
115. Id at 706.
116. 628 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. 1982).
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sequently paid over $68,000 more in taxes than it otherwise would have
paid. When the Comptroller refused to allow Hewlett-Packard to utilize
the alternative computation method after June 1, the company filed suit to
declare the rule invalid. Hewlett-Packard alleged that the rule was
adopted merely to serve the convenience of the Comptroller and not in
furtherance of any statutory purpose." t 7 The supreme court upheld the
validity of the rule because it "need not be, in the court's opinion, wise,
desirable, or even necessary," so long as it is within the agency's grant of
authority.' "8 Even if the rule had no rationale behind it other than admin-
istrative convenience, this justification was sufficient to uphold its
validity. "19
Generally speaking, before an administrative agency may adopt a rule it
must first publish a proposed draft to afford the public an opportunity to
comment on the rule. The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register
Act (APTRA) requires a minimum of thirty days notice before a proposed
rule can be formally adopted. 120 State Board of Insurance v. Deffebach 121
raised the issue of how often an agency must republish a proposed rule
that it has revised in response to public comments. The Board of Insur-
ance published a proposed rule on December 25, 1979. After receiving
public comment, the Board published a revised version of the proposed
rule in February 1980. The Board again received public comments and
again revised the rule, but this time only published a final rule in July
1980. Deffebach brought suit challenging the rule, arguing in part that the
Board should have published the rule a third time for comment because of
substantial changes it allegedly made. The district court agreed and invali-
dated the rule.122
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and held
that the Board met the publication requirements of the APTRA. 123 The
court noted that the literal provisions of the APTRA require only one pub-
lication of a proposed rule, regardless of how much the rule in its final
form has been changed in response to the public comments received.' 24
The court held, however, that a more reasonable interpretation of the stat-
ute was required and enunciated a test for determining when republication
of a proposed rule is necessary:
After proper notice and hearing, should the agency incorporate public
comments into the proposed rule and should such rule affect no other
117. The rule was, in fact, adopted for purposes of administrative convenience. "June 1
is fifteen days prior to the June 15 deadline for reporting corporate franchise taxes. The
Comptroller needs to know, prior to that deadline, how many taxpayers need special treat-
ment. [This]. . . helps the Comptroller plan his. . . activities so that he. . . can attempt to




120. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
121. 631 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
122. Id at 796.
123. Id at 802.
124. Id at 800.
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subject or person than those previously given notice, . . . no further
purpose would be served by requiring republication of the proposed
rules. Conversely, should the proposed rules, as originally published,
be ignored and others adopted or should other subjects or persons be
affected by the altered rule, a new round of notice and comment
should be required.' 25
Applying this test to the rule in issue, the court determined that the final
version of the rule did not regulate any new parties or affect any new sub-
jects.126 Consequently, no republication was necessary, and the rule was
valid as promulgated. 127
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Availability of Review
A common misconception is that any person aggrieved by agency action
may as a matter of right obtain judicial review of such action. This notion
is not the case at all. Rather, the prevailing Texas law is that there is no
right to judicial review of agency action unless expressly authorized by the
enabling statute creating the agency or unless constitutional rights or
vested property interests are involved.' 28 Bank of Woodson v. Stewart' 29
presented an interesting situation in which the plaintiffs combination of
constitutional and statutory rights led to perplexing results. A state-
chartered bank headquartered in Throckmorton County brought suit in
Travis County to enjoin the State Commissioner of Banking and the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation from summarily closing and liquidat-
ing the bank. The bank alleged that the summary closing violated both its
constitutional and statutory rights of notice and hearing. The State Bank-
ing Code provided, however, that the exclusive venue for a statutory ap-
peal was the county of the bank's domicile, or Throckmorton County.'
30
Based on this statutory provision, the Travis County district court dis-
missed the suit for want of jurisdiction.13
The Austin court of appeals affirmed that part of the district court's
judgment dismissing the bank's causes of action based on alleged viola-
tions of the Banking Code.' 32 The court relied on the rule that the legisla-
ture, having created the right, could control the remedy and held that the
bank's statutory causes of action would have to be tried in Throckmorton
County.133 The court reached a different conclusion, however, with regard
to the bank's causes of action alleging violations of its constitutional rights.
125. Id at 801. The court acknowledged that the rule was very general and would have
to be refined, but considered it sufficient for the present case. Id.
126. Id at 802.
127. Id
128. See Hill & Kent, 1981 Survey, supra note 93, at 487-90.
129. 632 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin), writ dism'd as mootper curiam, 641 S.W.2d
230 (Tex. 1982).
130. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-805 (Vernon 1973).
131. 632 S.W.2d at 953.
132. Id at 955, 960.
133. Id at 955.
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Banks have vested property rights in their charters and, therefore, have an
inherent right to judicial review of agency action impairing those rights,
irrespective of the Banking Code provisions for judicial review.' 34 Ac-
cordingly, the bank had the right to seek adjudication of its constitutional
claims wherever it saw fit to do so, including Travis County, and the
Travis County district court improperly dismissed the constitutional claims
for want of jurisdiction. 35 The court of appeals therefore remanded the
constitutional claims to the Travis County district court and created the
need for two lawsuits in two counties between the same parties litigating
the same fact, although on different theories.'
36
In an effort to harmonize the inevitable conflict between the two suits,
the court held that the Travis County court, having acquired jurisdiction
first, could determine the constitutional claims without interference from
the Throckmorton County court. 37 If the Travis County court ruled in
the bank's favor, the ruling would obviate the need for the Throckmorton
County suit. At the same time, however, the Travis County court would
not be allowed to issue orders during the pendency of its suit to disturb the
assets of the bank, which were within the jurisdiction of the Throckmorton
County court as part of the liquidation proceeding. 38 Recognizing that
this still presented an awkward situation, the court of appeals suggested
that the parties consider transferring and consolidating the cases into one
proceeding in Throckmorton County. 39
Contrary to Texas law, there is a general presumption at the federal
level in favor of the availability of judicial review. ' 40 Even there, however,
not all agency action is reviewable. Although the federal Administrative
134. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427, 433 (Tex. 1963).
135. See 632 S.W.2d at 959. The court of appeals analogized to the statute formerly
conferring exclusive jurisdiction on Travis County courts of all contests of Railroad Com-
mission orders, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6049c, § 8 (Vernon 1962) (repealed 1977)
(current version at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANNt. §§ 85.241-.243 (Vernon 1978)). 632 S.W.2d
at 958. According to the court, that statute was consistently interpreted to control jurisdic-
tion only of statutory causes of action and not common law causes of action, such as breach
of contract, negligence, trespass, etc., which exist independently of the statute but may be
tangentially connected with it in a particular case. Id By the same token, the bank's consti-
tutional rights exist independently of the Banking Code and, therefore, cannot be controlled
by the jurisdictional provisions of the Code.
136. 632 S.W.2d at 960.
137. Id
138. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-806 (Vernon 1973) (assets in custody
of court of domicile).
139. 632 S.W.2d at 960. The result should be compared to that reached in Texas Em-
ployment Comm'n v. Norris, 636 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1982, writ dism'd
w.o.j.). The trial court in Norris issued a temporary injunction compelling the Texas Em-
ployment Commission (TEC) to pay unemployment benefits to the plaintiff during the pen-
dency of his suit contesting the TEC's administrative denial of his application for such
benefits. Id. at 249. The court of appeals vacated the injunction, holding that while the trial
court properly had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal of the TEC's order, it had no
jurisdiction to compel the TEC to pay the unemployment benefits during the pendency of
the suit. Id at 252. The appellate court held that the plaintiff could only enjoy such rights
as were conferred on him by statute, and since the statute did not authorize injunctive relief
of the type involved here, no such relief was available to the plaintiff. Id at 251-52.
140. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 148 (1976).
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Procedures Act generally grants aggrieved parties a right to judicial re-
view, 14 1 it nevertheless exempts from judicial review administrative action
that is "committed to agency discretion by law."' 42 The meaning of this
exception was analyzed in Suntex Dairy v. Block. 143 An order of the Sec-
retary of Agriculture merged six milk marketing orders in Texas into one
single new order that regulated the former six-market area and additional
previously unregulated counties. To issue a milk marketing order, the Sec-
retary of Agriculture must make three findings. The first finding must be
preceded by and based upon an evidentiary hearing, but the latter two
findings are not required to be preceded by or based upon a hearing. 44
The complaining party argued that none of the three findings in this in-
stance was supported by substantial evidence and that all three were arbi-
trary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
The Fifth Circuit upheld the order because the Secretary's first finding
was supported by substantial evidence and valid, and the last two findings
were committed to agency discretion and were not reviewable. 45 The
court recognized that the "agency discretion exception" is narrow. and is
generally limited to three types of cases:
(1) the statute in question is "drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply, [and] courts. . . have no statutory
question to review." . . . ; (2) the courts are simply "ill-equipped"
through a lack of expertise to review the decision in question... ;
and (3) the agency action involves decisions relating to areas, such as
national defense, that "lie outside sound judicial domain in terms of
aptitude, facilities and responsibility."' 46
The milk marketing order fell within the first two categories. 147 The court
placed great emphasis on the fact that the Secretary only had to conduct an
evidentiary hearing for the first required finding, but was allowed to make
the second and third required findings without benefit of a hearing. 48 Be-
cause of the "Byzantine nature of milk marketing regulation," the Fifth
Circuit concluded it lacked the expertise to second-guess the Secretary's
findings that were made without benefit of an evidentiary hearing and rec-
ord. ' 49 Accordingly, the court held that the findings were committed to the
Secretary's discretion and were therefore nonreviewable.' 50
141. "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
142. Id § 701(a).
143. 666 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 59, 74 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1982).
144. The statutory scheme is explained in the court's opinion, 666 F.2d at 160-61.
145. Id at 162-63.
146. Id at 163-64 (citations omitted).
147. Id at 164-65.
148. Id
149. Id at 166.
150. Id at 167. The court did hold that the plaintiffs were free to raise questions of
procedural irregularity or fraud in the manner in which these nonreviewable discretionary
findings were made. Id None of these questions, however, were present in this case.
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B. Method of Review
Since the passage of the APTRA and the supreme court's decision in
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utility Commission,15, the as-
sumption is commonly made that only two methods of judicial review of
agency action exist: trial de novo or substantial evidence confined to the
agency record. 152 This assumption has not always proven to be the case,
since an agency's specific enabling statute may affect the method of review.
One recurring problem involves judicial review of Texas Employment
Commission (TEC) orders. The TEC originally was subject to the judicial
review provisions of the APTRA, which limited review to the agency rec-
ord.'53 In 1979, however, the TEC was exempted from those provisions of
the APTRA, thus returning it to a trial de novo review. 15 4 In Texas Em-
ployment Commission v. Bell Helicopter International, Inc. ,155 the amend-
ment took effect after the TEC proceeding but prior to the judicial review
hearing. Apparently, the parties did not adduce new evidence at the judi-
cial hearing, but relied only on the agency record. On appeal, therefore,
the court of appeals had no statement of facts by which it could review the
judgment of the trial court. The court held that the 1979 amendments
were procedural in nature and became applicable at the time of their en-
actment. 156 Accordingly, since the court had no statement of facts to re-
view, it affirmed the trial court's judgment on the presumption that all
evidence necessary to support the judgment was presented at the trial court
hearing. 157
An unusual method of review is found in the Texas Water Rights Adju-
dication Act. 158 The Act was passed for the purpose of determining ripa-
rian rights'5 9 and created a two-step procedure for that determination.
First, the Texas Water Rights Commission makes a final determination of
the water rights claims brought before it.160 The final determination is
then filed with a district court, 161 and the court conducts hearings on ex-
ceptions to the final determination filed with the court. 162 The court may
base its resolution of any exception solely on the administrative record,
take additional evidence, or remand the exception to the agency for further
151. 571 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1978).
152. See id at 507-09; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-3 1a, § 19 (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983). For a general introduction to the substantial evidence rule, see B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 140, § 210; Hill & Kent, 1982 Survey, supra note 93, at 539-40.
153. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
154. Id. § 21(f).
155. 627 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
156. Id. at 526.
157. Id. A similar problem arose with the same result in Texas Employment Comm'n v.
City of Houston, 616 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]), writ refdn.r.e. per
curiam, 618 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. 1982).
158. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.301-.341 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
159. Id § 11.302.
160. Id. § 11.315.
161. Id § 11.317.
162. Id § 11.319.
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evidence.' 63 The Act provides that the court, in passing on the exceptions,
"shall determine all issues of law and fact independently of the commis-
sion's determination" and that "the substantial evidence rule shall not be
used."' 164 The Act makes no mention of a trial de novo.
None of this review procedure fits very neatly with the provisions of the
APTRA, and consequently, the court in In re Adjudication of Upper
Guadalupe River Segmen 165 was left to determine the meaning of these
provisions on its own. The court observed that three methods of judicial
review of agency action exist: (1) "Minimum Review," through which the
court confines itself to a determination of whether or not the agency record
contains substantial evidence supporting the agency's 'decision; (2) "Inter-
mediate Review," through which the court makes its own independent
judgment based on the agency record; and (3) "Maximum Review,"
through which the court "ignores the agency record" and makes its own
independent judgment based on the evidence adduced before it.166 Of
course, the APTRA was supposed to eliminate the "intermediate review"
stage. The court determined, however, that the Act appeared to specify the
"intermediate review" method.167 The court held that the reviewing court
could exercise its own independent judgment on the facts and the law, but
that the Commission's order was entitled to a presumption of validity and
that the complaining party had the burden of demonstrating the order was
contrary to the weight of the evidence. 68
C. Scope of Review
Prior to the passage of the APTRA, courts reviewing orders of adminis-
trative agencies tended to equate the "substantial evidence" standard of
review with the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. Section
19(e) of the APTRA specifically lists the two standards as separate grounds
for reversal of an agency decision,169 and the arbitrary and capricious rule
is now established as an independent ground for reversal.' 70 The real
meaning of the term is, however, left unclear.
The Austin court of appeals addressed this point in Community Savings
& Loan Association v. Vandygrif, 17' an appeal of an order approving an
application for a savings and loan association branch office. The appellant
claimed that the agency order constituted an abuse of discretion because
the agency failed to evaluate properly the evidence presented. The court
of appeals observed that the substance of these arguments was simply that
163. Id § 11.321.
164. Id. § 11.320.
165. 625 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981), aff'd sub noma. In re Adjudica-
tion of Water Rights of Upper Guadalupe Segment, 642 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1982).
166. 625 S.W.2d at 363.
167. Id
168. Id at 364.
169. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(e) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
170. Starr County v. Starr Indus. Servs., Inc., 584 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
171. 630 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
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the agency chose not to believe or be persuaded by the appellant's evi-
dence and was not directed to any particular agency action that could be
identified as arbitrary or capricious. 172 The court concluded that it could
not evaluate under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard the agency's
subjective mental processes in weighing the evidence; it would have to rely
instead on the substantial evidence standard. 173 Under this standard the
court upheld the order as valid.' 74 The court concluded that the arbitrary
and capricious standard was meant to be a "safety net" to cover agency
action that should be reversed, but did not fit neatly into any of the other
statutory grounds for reversal. 75 The court refused to define precisely the
meaning of the rule, stating: "A pristine and all-inclusive definition of
what constitutes a violation of the stricture against administrative action
implied in subsection (6) [arbitrary and capricious] is inherently impracti-
cal of statement, beyond saying that it is an action unreasonable in all the
circumstances of the particular case under judicial review."176
Some direction may be gleaned from the federal practice, in which the
Administrative Procedures Act proclaims unlawful agency action that is
"arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of discretion."' 177 This provision is
viewed as a narrow standard of review by which the court may only con-
sider whether the agency decision "was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.'178
The Fifth Circuit held that "judicial review may focus only on the factors
considered and the existence of an obvious error in judgment."'' 79 The
APTRA, however, provides a somewhat broader standard than the federal
statute, since it proscribes agency action that is "arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion."' 80 This language, patterned after that in the Revised Model
State Administrative Procedure Act, is intended to reach "unjustoed use,
as well as abuse, of discretion."'' 8'
One writer has categorized certain types of actions as falling within the
arbitrary and capricious standard. Not intended as an all-inclusive list, it
sets forth the following "categories of abuse": "(1) improper purpose;
(2) erroneous and extraneous considerations; (3) erroneous legal or factual
foundation; (4) failure to consider relevant considerations; (5) inaction or
delay; and (6) departure from established precedents or practice."' 82 The
few Texas cases interpreting the arbitrary and capricious provision of the
172. See id at 458.
173. Id
174. Id at 462.
175. Id at 459 n.3.
176. Id
177. 4 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
178. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
179. Suntex Dairy v. Block, 666 F.2d 158, 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 59, 74 L.
Ed. 2d 62 (1982).
180. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANNw. art. 6252-13a, § 19(e)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
(emphasis added).
181. 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 756 (1965) (emphasis in original).
182. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 140, § 218.
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APTRA fit within these categories.183 One such case decided in the survey
period was Public Utility Commission v. South Plains Electric Cooperative,
Inc. ,184 an appeal from an order of the Public Utility Commission (PUC)
granting a dual certificate to a municipally owned utility. Although the
underlying facts were "overwhelmingly" against the granting of the certifi-
cate, the PUC nevertheless granted it based on the perception that a mu-
nicipally owned utility was entitled to preferential treatment in obtaining
the right to serve the people within its boundaries.' 85 The Public Utility
Regulatory Act 186 makes no particular distinction in this respect between
private and municipally owned utilities. Yet, this nonstatutory ground was
the motivating factor for the PUC's decision. The Austin court overturned
the PUC's order and held that "an agency's consideration of a non-statu-
tory standard amounts to arbitrary and capricious action requiring
reversal." 187
183. See Cameron County Good Gov't League v. Ramon, 619 S.W.2d 224, 229-30 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (abuse of discretion in failure to comply with
competitive bidding statute); Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Good Spirits, Inc., 616
S.W.2d 411, 414-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ) (arbitrary and unreasonable de-
parture from prior practice); Starr County v. Starr Indus. Servs., Inc., 584 S.W.2d 352, 355-
56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (arbitrary and capricious consideration of
extraneous factors).
184. 635 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
185. Id at 956.
186. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1982-1983).
187. 635 S.W.2d at 957.
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